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ABSTRACT 
Rainier Jaarsma: The EU’s Lopsided Queue:  
Conditionality, Compliance, and the Diverging Accession Paths of Macedonia and Serbia 
(Under the direction of Robert F. Jenkins) 
 
 This thesis analyzes the differentiation of European Union accession momentum in Serbia and 
Macedonia. Although Serbia and Macedonia face similar domestic challenges in their EU accession 
sagas, Serbia has recently managed to outpace Macedonia, once a frontrunner in the process. The 
author assesses this divergence to stem from the institutional and political setup of EU enlargement, 
and stresses the importance for acceding countries to have a credible European perspective, and for the 
institutions of the EU to apply political conditionality consistently and constructively. The final section of 
the thesis suggests how the EU’s experience in Serbia could form the basis for a jumpstart of 
Macedonia’s EU accession bid.  
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INTRODUCTION 
With the war in Ukraine raging, and the Syrian refugee crisis threatening the cohesion of the European 
Union, 2015 marked a critical year for the European project. The increased tensions on Europe’s 
borderlands have sparked renewed interest in the European periphery. Both crises have highlighted the 
dependency of the European Union on its non-EU partners. Whereas the war in Ukraine has clearly 
indicated the sensitivities of the European alignment of prospective member states vis-à-vis the Russian 
Federation, the refugee crisis has revealed how pivotal political coordination with non-EU member 
states can be. As over 500,000 migrants passed through Macedonia and Serbia on their way to Western 
Europe in 2015, these two prospective member states have started to play a key role in the European 
facilitation of refugees. The primacy of the refugee crisis has reinvigorated the necessity of coordinating 
European Union policies with the states of the Western Balkans,1 as well as increased international 
interest in the region.  
 The European Union has a longstanding history of engagement with the Western Balkans. 
Following the catastrophic wars of Yugoslav secession in the early nineties, the European Union 
recognized the need to establish a framework for relations with the former Yugoslav states.  Although 
this framework started out in 1996 with the intention to maintain political stability and push the 
successful implementation of the Dayton and Erdut peace agreements (EUR-Lex 1999), in 1999 it 
transformed into a more comprehensive approach with the establishment of the Stabilization and 
                                                          
1 Institutions of the European Union and its member states define Southeastern Europe in political-geographical 
terms as the Western Balkans, thereby omitting EU-member states Greece, Slovenia, and recently, Croatia. 
Therefore, the term ‘Western Balkans’ in this paper refers to the state entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Montenegro, the Republic of Serbia, the Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of Albania, and to the disputed 
territory of Kosovo. Recognizing the status dispute that has arisen over Kosovo since its proclamation of 
independence in 2008, this paper will treat Kosovo as a de facto independent entity, but will avoid terminology 
that affirms Kosovo’s statehood, in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244.  
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Accession Process (SAP). The launch of the SAP also confirmed the possibility of eventual EU 
membership for the targeted states. Following the conflicts in Kosovo and Macedonia, and in line with 
the extensive enlargement process of the European Union that would take place in 2004, the European 
Council reaffirmed its full support towards the European integration of the Western Balkans at the 
Thessaloniki Summit, held on 21 June 2003. The declaration that was signed by the heads of state of all 
European Union member states and of all Western Balkan states minus Slovenia (which was due to 
accede to the EU in 2004) was unambiguous in its wording: 
The EU reiterates its unequivocal support to the European perspective of the Western 
Balkan countries. The future of the Balkans is within the European Union. The ongoing 
enlargement and the signing of the Treaty of Athens in April 2003 inspire and encourage 
the countries of the Western Balkans to follow the same successful path. (Thessaloniki 
Summit 2004) 
 The optimism prevailed for a few years as frontrunners Croatia and Macedonia applied for 
membership and were granted candidate status in 2004 and 2005, but the problems that arose from the 
European Union’s successive enlargements in 2004, and especially from the accession of Romania and 
Bulgaria in 2007, have since cast a long shadow over the enlargement process in Southeastern Europe. 
Over time, the inequalities between the former Yugoslav republics have resurfaced, with Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro and Macedonia trailing far behind Croatia (which acceded to the EU 
in 2013) and Serbia. As of 2016, Serbia is the only country in the Western Balkans that may become part 
of the European Union by 2020. 
 The disparity in these countries’ paths towards EU accession is not easily explained. The 
multiplicity of actors involved in the enlargement process, as well as the increasing complexity of the 
enlargement process itself, render it difficult to offer a single satisfying answer that would attempt to 
explain the divergent paths. Regional analytical approaches to the challenges of enlargement in the 
Western Balkans have certainly been attempted in the last few years (Taylor, Geddes & Lees 2013, 
Vachudova 2013, Noutcheva 2012), but the complexity of the region has proven too vast to allow for a 
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satisfying conclusion. The peculiarities of Montenegro’s accession process translate difficultly to 
Albania’s struggle in receiving candidate status, and Kosovo’s unique relationship vis-à-vis Serbia make 
any comparison with, for example, the problems that Bosnia & Herzegovina is facing inherently 
problematic.  Instead of attempting to solve the grand question of Western Balkans enlargement, this 
thesis will take a detailed comparative approach, and will restrict itself to an analysis of two of the six 
Western Balkans states currently in the waiting room. Two accession sagas stand out in particular; 
Serbia’s rise from alleged warmonger and justice obstructionist to the current accession-frontrunner, 
and Macedonia’s remarkable backpedaling since mid-2000. Whereas Serbia’s European perspective 
gained traction with the arrest of Ratko Mladic in 2011, Macedonia’s has arguably lost its European 
compass after a very promising start, which in 2015 also prompted the European Commission to 
withdraw its positive recommendation for the formal start of accession negotiations with the country. 
The Commission’s decision is remarkable as it has never before withdrawn a positive recommendation 
to start accession negotiations, but it is a logical response to the backsliding that has occurred in 
Macedonia since the change of government in 2006. Acknowledging that the causes for backsliding are 
multi-faceted, this thesis will argue that the amalgam of a weakened European perspective and 
unfavorable political conditions within Macedonia lies at the heart of the country’s regress. 
 The dissimilarity of both countries’ paths towards the European Union is remarkable given the 
similar political characteristics of Serbia and Macedonia. Both candidate states can be characterized as 
ambiguous hybrid regimes (Diamond, 23). Although multi-party elections have been in place in both 
countries since the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the fairness of these elections has been impaired by an 
uneven political playing field. Clientelist elements featured prominently in both countries include the 
assertion of control over the media by political elites, the frequent issuing of early elections to sustain 
political power, party influence over public administration appointments, systematic defamation 
campaigns aimed at oppositional forces, a quasi-independent judiciary, and so forth. According to the 
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Corruption Perceptions Index annually issued by Transparency International, the perceived level of 
corruption in Serbia and Macedonia in 2015 is nearly equal (Macedonia ranks 66th, Serbia 71st). Freedom 
of the press is curbed significantly in both countries, and self-censorship is rampant (Bieber 2015). 
Alignment with the EU acquis is comparable, as the Commission has assessed Macedonia to be 
moderately prepared with regards to 24 chapters of the acquis, whereas Serbia has received this 
designation with regards to 25 chapters of the acquis (European Commission Progress Reports Serbia / 
Macedonia 2015). 
 The accession process is however not only dictated by internal political realities; accession to 
the European Union is far from a technocratic exercise, and enlargement policy itself has been subject to 
many historical and political developments. Although the Copenhagen Criteria were adopted in 1993 to 
define the criteria of eligibility for joining the European Union, their application by the various 
institutions of the European Union has been subject to increasing levels of politicization. The accession 
of Romania and Bulgaria to the European Union in 2007 has often been evoked to exemplify that the 
assessment of adherence to the Copenhagen Criteria is a deeply political process involving a multiplicity 
of international actors (Noutcheva 2008). The implementation of post-accession safeguards to secure 
the stability of institutions and rule of law in Romania and Bulgaria is just one example of how the 
European Union’s enlargement policy, and especially its application of conditionality, is constantly 
evolving.  Whereas in 1957 the Treaty of Rome stipulated that the only condition for membership was to 
have a ‘European identity,’ the states of the Western Balkans are nowadays subject to much more 
rigorous conditionality. The application thereof has however been haphazard at best. These are 
problems the thesis will address. 
 This thesis will first set out to explain how the enlargement process is structured for the 
Western Balkans, and how political conditionality has risen to the forefront of the accession procedure, 
especially since the enlargements of 2004 and 2007. Recognizing that the European Union’s accession 
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process is structured around different stages, I will focus on the conditionality involved in the two early 
stages of negotiations that take place between the prospective member states and the European 
Union’s institutions. These are the pre-negotiation stage and the negotiation stage, in which Macedonia 
and Serbia are currently located. These two stages of the European Union’s enlargement process 
feature different rewards for the applicant states and are characterized by different levels of 
conditionality. The political challenges in both stages are however very similar; acceding states do not 
only have to fulfill the demands set by the European Commission, but are de facto also required to gain 
the necessary political support for their membership bids. One of the goals of this thesis is to explain 
how this latter requirement, i.e. the necessity of gathering political support from member states in the 
process, has impacted Macedonia in a fundamentally different way than it has impacted Serbia. As such, 
this thesis rejects the notion that the current enlargement procedure as set up by the institutions of the 
European Union is largely technocratic (Chiva 2011, O’Brennan 2008) and highlights the possibility of 
political intervention in the process and the political versatility of EU institutions, most notably that of 
the European Commission. As a further elaboration on this perspective, this thesis will then proceed to 
evaluate the role of veto players and its linkage with the incentive structure embedded in the accession 
procedure. Ultimately, this thesis will argue that the politicization of Enlargement and inconsistent 
application of political conditionality in the two early stages of the accession process have become the 
main causes of the divergent levels of progress towards EU accession for Serbia and for Macedonia.  
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THE ENLARGEMENT PROCESS: FROM THE SAP TO THE OPENING AND CLOSING OF ACCESSION 
CHAPTERS 
“EU enlargement is a function of differentiated influences from multiple actors and external 
pressures.” (Gateva 2015, 3) 
The EU accession process for the Western Balkans differs from the process that was originally 
envisioned for Central and Eastern Europe. A key aspect of the accession process to the European Union 
with regards to the Western Balkans is that it is fundamentally asymmetric. Whereas member states 
that have acceded to the European Union in the past — primarily due to the new historical environment 
in which the process took place — have been able to influence the EU’s accession procedure, the 
evolution of the European Union over the last decade has rendered prospective member state influence 
over the receiving end of the process negligible. This asymmetry was much less developed in the 1990s, 
when most Central-East European states were given the chance to adapt their post-communist political 
systems in order to be incorporated into the European Union. States such as Hungary and Poland were 
not mere policy-takers; negotiations with the European Union often took a relatively open format and 
allowed the countries of Central Europe to also act as policy-shapers (Taylor, Geddes & Lees 2013, 11). 
Recognizing the strategic benefits of including the former states of the Warsaw Pact in the European 
project, contemporary forms of country-specific political conditionality were largely absent from the 
process. Hence, in 2004 the European Union was able to incorporate ten new member states in one 
year. A similar open-ended format of negotiations and a more regionalized form of conditionality, in 
which the prospective member states can negotiate the formal demands, is inconceivable with regards 
to the Western Balkans. The European Union dictates the structure of the accession process, the 
conditions countries have to meet, the rewards countries will receive, and is firmly in charge of the 
monitoring process. The goal of the EU accession process for the European Union is to “reorient the 
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direction and shape of politics [in prospective member states] to the degree that the EU’s political and 
economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making” 
(Ladrech 1994, 69).  
 Countries interested in acceding to the European Union have to follow a pre-determined path 
towards accession. The first step is typically the signing of an association agreement, but with regard to 
the Western Balkans, the European Union follows a slightly different track. The countries of the Western 
Balkans are part of the distinct Stabilization and Association Process (SAP). As part of this process, all 
countries are expected to fulfill country-specific Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA). These 
agreements confirm the willingness of the states that are interested in EU membership to commit to 
political reforms that are necessary in order to start formal negotiations with the European Union. The 
signing and adaptation of the SAA is therefore part of another stage of the enlargement process than 
the stage in which the formal negotiations take place; prospective member states are expected to sign, 
initial, and put a SAA in force prior to the start of negotiations on EU accession. The depth of policy 
harmonization expected from putting a SAA in force is far less dramatic than the harmonization that is 
expected at the end of the negotiations stage that normally follows the adaptation of the SAA. Because 
the implementation of the SAA is more open-ended than the harmonization expected from the 
negotiations phase of the process, all Western Balkans states with the exception of Kosovo2 have 
implemented the agreements. The signing of the SAA has to be ratified by all current member states of 
the European Union before it effectively goes into effect (and allows a country to move forward towards 
the next stage), which provides member states with major influence over this stage of the process. The 
politicization of the SAA ratification process is an important phenomenon that I will return to in-depth 
later in this thesis. 
                                                          
2 Kosovo’s limited recognition within the EU has significantly hindered the initialing of its SAA. In order to move 
Kosovo’s SAA forward and prevent problems with member state ratification of the signing of the SAA, the EU has 
conferred legal personality to itself in the initialing of the SAA.  
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 The signing and implementation of the SAA opens the door to two important rewards in the 
accession process: the formal granting of candidate status and the formal opening of accession 
negotiations. After successful signing, implementation, and ratification of the SAA, a country can apply 
for EU membership. The latest country to apply for EU membership at the time of writing is Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, which handed over its application for membership to the President of the Council of the 
European Union on February 15, 2016, after its SAA had entered into force on June 1, 2015. Following 
the submission of an application, it is forwarded to the European Commission, which will give its expert 
opinion on the application. Concurrently, the European Parliament has to give its consent if the 
application is to be successful. The European Parliament’s consent requires an absolute majority vote. 
After both the European Parliament has given its consent and the European Commission has issued a 
favorable opinion, the European Council will decide whether the application for membership is 
successful, and whether official candidate status will be granted to the applicant. Unanimity in the 
European Council is required for candidate status to be granted. While Serbia was only granted 
candidate status in March 2012, Macedonia received it more than six years prior, in December 2005.  
 Once a state has been granted formal candidate status, it will have to continue the 
implementation of the SAA in order for the European Commission to recommend the start of 
negotiations. The European Commission monitors the progress of all states of the Western Balkans in its 
yearly progress reports, which are the result of intensive cooperation between the European 
Commission, European Union member states, the government institutions of the state that is seeking 
membership, local NGO’s, and independent consultants. The European Commission’s progress reports 
annually highlight the challenges a prospective member state is facing and assess the readiness of the 
prospective member state to move to the next stage of the accession process. In its 2015 
communication, the Commission elaborated on the methodology used:  
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This Commission has introduced this year a strengthened approach to its assessments in 
the annual reports. In addition to reporting on progress, much more emphasis is put on the 
state of play in the countries and where they stand in terms of preparedness for taking on 
the obligations of membership. At the same time, the reports provide even clearer 
guidance for what the countries are expected to do in both the short and long term. 
Harmonized assessment scales are used to assess both the state of play and the level of 
progress, increasing comparability between the countries. The new style of reporting 
provides greater transparency in the accession process. This should facilitate greater 
scrutiny of reforms by all stakeholders. This new approach has been applied in particular to 
a number of pilot areas directly linked to the fundamental reform required on the EU path. 
(European Commission Enlargement Strategy 2015) 
The European Commission may recommend the start of negotiations with a state that has been granted 
candidate status if it meets the minimal benchmarks that the Commission has set, and the timing of a 
positive opinion varies, because conditionality is in play throughout the process. Whereas the opening of 
accession negotiations with Croatia took place six months after it had become a formal candidate, 
Serbia and Montenegro had to wait respectively fifteen and eighteen months. Macedonia received a 
critical progress report in 2006 (one year after it received candidate status) and only received the 
European Commission’s first recommendation to start accession negotiations three years later.  
 Once the European Commission has issued its recommendation to the Council of the European 
Union, the Council unanimously decides on the start of negotiations with a given candidate state, which 
also marks the formal beginning of the negotiation stage in the enlargement procedure. In order not to 
delegitimize the credibility of the Commission’s recommendation, the Council of the European Union in 
practice has always followed up the Commission’s opinion, with one noteworthy exception: The Council 
has set aside six consecutive recommendations from the European Commission to start accession 
negotiations with Macedonia over the period from 2009 until 2015 due to a lack of unanimity among EU 
member states. Although an overwhelming majority of EU member states have been in favor of starting 
accession negotiations with Macedonia, the Greek government has effectively become a crucial veto 
player in the process. Greek obstructionism to Macedonia’s bid to join the European Union has 
furthermore been supported by Bulgaria since 2013, following the worsening of bilateral relations 
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between Macedonia and Bulgaria. Although the Commission already recognized in 2008 that the 
resolution of the Greek-Macedonian name dispute will effectively form a precondition to EU accession, 
it has not actively engaged in the dispute, which is surprising given the weight the Commission ascribes 
to the process of normalization in the rest of the Western Balkans, most notably with regards to 
normalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina. However, the institutional setup of the 
European Union severely hinders its ability to exert political leverage over one of its member states vis-
à-vis an acceding state.  
 Entering the negotiation stage of the process is far from a symbolic exercise. The opening of 
negotiations is followed by extensive screening of a country’s current level of harmonization with the 
European acquis communautaire by the European Commission and the candidate country. The 
screening process is important as it highlights the areas in which significant progress is required before 
accession talks can be conducted. The screening process is organized along thirty-three chapters, which 
range from agriculture and rural development to energy policies and the judiciary. The screening 
procedure also allows the candidate country to become more familiar with the acquis. Candidate 
countries in this stage have to submit specific action plans to the European Commission, in which they 
provide specific strategies on how to harmonize existing legislation with the acquis. Once the screening 
has been completed and chapter action plans have been approved by the Commission, the Commission 
may decide to open a chapter in order to formally start the process of aligning legislation in the 
particular field of the opened chapter. The opening and closing of chapters is the main benchmark in 
this stage to assess the progress a candidate country is making towards accession.  
 Since the European Commission adopted its new methodology in 2015, two chapters in 
particular are considered crucial in the negotiation stage: Chapter 23 on the Judiciary & Fundamental 
Rights, and Chapter 24 on Justice, Freedom, and Security. Although the protection of human rights and 
independence of the judiciary have always been important factors taken into account in the EU 
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accession process, the ‘new approach’ provides a more structured framework for negotiations. In future 
accession negotiations, the Commission will open Chapter 23 and Chapter 24 as early as possible, and 
will only aim to close them after all other chapters have been closed. The new approach also introduced 
interim benchmarks to further guide the reform process, and allows the Commission to halt all 
negotiations on other chapters if progress on Chapter 23 and Chapter 24 is lagging (European Commission 
Enlargement Strategy 2015). By putting these two particular chapters at the heart of accession 
negotiations, the Commission hopes for acceding countries to have a very firm judicial foundation in 
protecting the rights of its citizens. Recent backsliding in East European member states such as Poland 
and Hungary has arguably reinvigorated the belief that without a sound judicial system in new member 
states, basic human rights and the values enshrined in the Copenhagen Criteria will continue to be at 
risk. The first country to be affected by the Commission’s new approach is Serbia, which is expected to 
open Chapter 23 and Chapter 24 before the end of 2016.  
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ON CONDITIONALITY: EVOLUTION, DIFFERENTIATION, AND POLITICIZATION 
The literature on European integration is not decisive on what exactly constitutes conditionality. 
Different theorists have outlined different forms of conditionality, including accession conditionality 
(Grabbe 2002), acquis conditionality (Grabbe 2002, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004), democratic 
conditionality (Pridham 2002) and enlargement conditionality (Hughes, Sasse and Gordon, 2004, 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004), which correspond with the different stages of the enlargement 
process. Whereas Pridham’s concept of democratic conditionality puts much emphasis on the necessity 
of new member states to adopt the democratic standards prominently featured in the Copenhagen 
Criteria, the more contemporary notions recognize this particular type of conditionality as a subtype of 
the broader enlargement conditionality (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004). Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier argue that democratic or political conditionality is the soft counterpart — characteristic of 
the pre-negotiations stage dominated by the signing of Stabilization and Association Agreements — of 
the more well-defined acquis conditionality, which becomes more dominant later in the accession 
process.  Hughes, Sasse and Gordon particularly stress the evolutionary nature of the different types of 
conditionality, and argue that accession to the European Union is a process marked by necessary 
differentiation, and that conditionality has been used in a rather flexible manner depending on a 
plurality of factors, including the policy area, the country concerned, and the political context in which it 
is applied (526). Recognizing the vast differences between the states applying for EU membership, 
Hughes, Sasse and Gordon emphasize that the subsequent enlargements of the European Union have 
led to further differentiation of conditionality. This thesis suggests that the flexibility and differentiation 
of political conditionality has been apparent with regards to Serbia and Macedonia, and takes the 
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position that these developments are at the heart of the diverging levels of EU accession progress in 
both countries.  
 Political conditionality originated in the field of development studies, where it was originally 
envisioned as a negative form of conditionality that allowed donor governments to put pressure on the 
recipient state by issuing threats of revoking aid when conditions were not sufficiently met (Stokke 
1995, 12). Although it was primarily conceived as an enforcement mechanism, alternative 
conceptualizations have stressed the inverse possibility of positive political conditionality, in which the 
fulfillment of conditions leads to benefits (Koch 2015, 101). Political conditionality can therefore be 
considered both an enforcement mechanism and an incentive mechanism. In terms of enlargement, 
political conditionality is a specific subset of conditions that accompany (or intensify) the existing 
conditionality framework based on the Copenhagen Criteria and the acquis communautaire. As there is 
no guiding framework for political conditionality, the use thereof by the institutions of the European 
Union is highly contextualized. An analysis focusing on the coherent application of political conditionality 
is therefore a difficult exercise, as inconsistency should be regarded one of the defining features of 
political conditionality. However, this thesis puts forward the normative notion that the level of 
(temporal and geographical) coherence in the application of political conditionality by the institutions of 
the European Union should be taken into the equation determining the conditionality’s imposition. 
From a rational-actor perspective, this would mean that political conditionalities that are not realistically 
attainable, or digress too far from the original conditionality structure (stretching the inconsistency), 
should not be imposed on prospective member states.  
 A second important distinction with regard to political conditionality is the difference between 
implicit and explicit political conditionality. The Dutch objective to impose tough ICTY-conditionality (a 
subset of political conditionality) on Serbia was an act of explicit political conditionality. The Greek 
objective to prevent Macedonia from joining the European Union prior to a solution to the name dispute 
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has been reached is an act of issuing implicit political conditionality; although it is not formally 
communicated to Macedonia, a solution to the name dispute is effectively a political condition 
Macedonia has to meet before it can join (and even move on towards) the European Union. Although 
one should expect explicit political conditionality to be more stringent due to its formal nature, the 
cases of Macedonia and Serbia reveal that implicit political conditionality can be applied just as strictly 
as explicit political conditionality.  
 The literature on conditionality has also shifted towards a more rational actor-approach as the 
enlargement procedure itself moved geographically closer towards Southeastern Europe, and perhaps 
more importantly, away from the Central European countries that had a long history of standing up to 
communism. Indeed, if the literature on the accession of Central European countries was largely driven 
by constructivist notions as passive leverage (Vachudova 2003), on a sense of belonging to a progressive 
value-system that was defined as ‘European’ (always in opposition to the Soviet other), the literature on 
the accession of the Western Balkans is more rooted in terms of active leverage (Vachudova 2003), with 
the EU explicitly eliciting compliance throughout the process. This shift has had an important 
repercussion for the use of political conditionality; it is now primarily used as a method of enforcement 
to guarantee necessary reforms in countries that are seemingly hesitant to adopt these reforms. This 
shift in theorizing Europeanization in part springs from different historical legacies; the softer, 
decentralized form of socialism that characterized the former Yugoslavia stands in stark contrast with 
the more Stalinist experiences of a socialist Central Europe that was eager to be incorporated into the 
existing West European structures after the fall of communism (Vachudova 2003). Furthermore, 
whereas the oppositional political forces in Central Europe often rallied on a platform of liberalization 
and resistance to the communist political and economic systems, in the former Yugoslavia the 
opposition to the communist regime was primarily characterized by its nationalist inclinations, which set 
the stage for a much more dramatic (and violent) transition process. The challenges to Europeanization 
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in the Balkans however also stem from developments within the European Union itself. The constant 
challenging of the European Union, both internally by its member states, and externally by the effects of 
globalization, economic crises, and the insecurity on the European periphery, has had its effect on the 
Union’s attractiveness, and on relations between the European Union and its candidate states. In turn, 
conditionality has evolved from its more general reliance on the Copenhagen Criteria, and has nowadays 
also become a crucial mechanism for the European Union to exert increasing levels of political (and 
financial) pressure on countries that are willing to join. 
 Differentiation of EU conditionality is an important and politically controversial development in 
Southeastern Europe. According to Eli Gateva, differentiation of conditionality does not only occur along 
the different stages of the accession procedure but is also historically and politically determined (Gateva 
26). The handing out of accession rewards — such as granting a country candidate status and the 
opening and closing of accession chapters — and the implicit and explicit threats issued by the different 
institutions of the European Union take place in changing political, geographical and strategic contexts, 
which undermines the continuity and consistency of the entire enlargement process. An example of the 
discontinuity can be found in the cases of Romania and Bulgaria, which nearly ten years after EU 
accession are still under comprehensive and innovative safeguard clauses better known as the 
Mechanism for Cooperation and Verification (CVM). The CVM was invoked by the European Commission 
to be of influence in the transitional process of new member states after they have acceded to the 
European Union. Although these safeguard clauses are instances of post-accession conditionality, the 
implementation thereof has also risen the bar in the pre-negotiation and negotiation stage of the 
enlargement process for the entire Western Balkans, with the laggards facing a level of country-specific 
critical scrutiny already in the process of the formal member state ratification of the Stabilization and 
Association Agreements that was absent when Romania and Bulgaria started their accession paths 
 16 
towards the European Union. With regard to the negotiation stage of the enlargement procedure in 
Romania and Bulgaria, Gateva observes the following: 
 “Although the EU did not change the structure of the accession negotiations, the 
instrumental approach of the Commission to setting the range and scope of the closing 
benchmarks illustrates the increasing application of detailed and differentiated 
conditionality.” (92) 
 Country-specific conditionality in the Western Balkans — or, more precisely, concerning Serbia 
and Croatia — was initially focused on full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). In December 2004, the Council of the European Union urged Croatia to fully 
cooperate with the ICTY, and rendered the opening of accession negotiations conditional on its 
compliance (Brussels European Council 2004). In practice, full cooperation meant timely and sufficient 
Croatian efforts to capture Ante Gotovina, who had been indicted by the ICTY on war crimes and crimes 
against humanity charges in connection with Operation Storm in 1995. Croatia failed to meet this 
requirement by the date that was set by the Commission —17 March 2005 — and therefore the 
commencement of negotiations was postponed. Although this may seem a rather hard form of 
conditionality, Croatia eventually still commenced negotiations, even though Gotovina had not been 
arrested yet. 
 Cooperation with the ICTY as a mechanism of country-specific conditionality was to a large 
extent member state-driven, as the ratification of the Stabilization and Association Agreement had 
already been stalled over member states’ concern over cooperation with the ICTY. The United Kingdom, 
Italy, and the Netherlands had stalled ratification of Croatia’s SAA until the end of 2004, and continued 
to express their demand for full cooperation with the ICTY also in the next stage of the accession 
procedure. As the Council of the European Union has to decide unanimously on the start of accession 
negotiations with a candidate state, its decision-making arrangements provide member states with 
significant veto powers over a critical stage in the accession procedure, especially in light of country-
specific conditionality.  
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 Eventually however, the conditions for starting accession negotiations with the Western Balkan 
states gradually expanded. In November 2010, for example, in review of Albania’s membership bid, the 
European Commission identified as many as twelve policy priorities that became conditions for Albania 
to start the negotiation stage of the enlargement process. On top of fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria, 
Albania’s opening of accession negotiations became conditional on the “adoption of pending laws 
requiring a reinforced majority in Parliament,” the appointment of an Ombudsman, modification of the 
legislative framework for elections in line with OSCE-ODIHR recommendations3, depoliticization of the 
Department of Public Administration, reinforcing the rights of Roma, and so forth (Commission Opinion 
on Albania’s Application for Membership, 2010).  
 The country-specific detail invoked here by the European Commission prior to the opening of 
accession negotiations signifies an important trend in the enlargement process. Gradually, the European 
Commission — prompted by the pivotal input of member states — is not only raising the bar for 
candidate states to meet criteria prior to the start of accession negotiations, but it is also transferring 
specific benchmarks that would beforehand be solely considered in the framework of key chapters of 
the acquis in the negotiation stage into the pre-negotiation stage of the process. This process is not 
inherently linked to Albania; it could also be observed in the negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina 
from the early-mid 2000s. In large part — and the Commission’s reformed methodology hints at this in 
its desire to conduct ‘interim’ benchmarks — this ‘advancement’ of conditionality to earlier stages of the 
process stems from the desire of member states to have more control over the accession process along 
the entire length of the enlargement procedure. However, it also forms an attempt to stretch the pre-
negotiation phase as long as possible, as the European Union believes that reform attempts are most 
successful when they are conducted as early on in the process as possible (General Affairs Council 2015). 
                                                          
3 These included the elimination of political party involvement in the selected of judges who adjudicate election 
appeals, clearer conditions to establish the necessity of repeat elections, restrictions on the provisions for public 
funding of electoral campaigns, and so forth (OSCE/ODIHR Election Report Albania, 2009).  
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Albania’s long list of specific conditionalities for example stands in stark contrast with the country-
specific conditionalities imposed on Bulgaria in the same stage of the enlargement procedure; back in 
1999, the start of accession negotiations with Bulgaria was solely conditional on “acceptable closure 
dates for units 1-4 of the Kozloduy Nuclear Plant” (Commission Opinion on Bulgaria’s Application for 
Membership, 1999). The large conditionality gap in this comparison indicates that over time, political 
conditionality has become institutionalized and is utilized more freely.  
 Increased levels of country-specific conditionality in response to earlier challenges faced, and 
the superimposition of reforms that were beforehand conducted in the negotiation stage onto the pre-
negotiation stage are not inherently problematic developments. These changes in the enlargement 
procedure however do become problematic once the inconsistency in the application of conditionality 
not only increases from one enlargement wave to the other but also expands across candidate states in 
a geographical and not merely temporal context. As individual member states become more invested in 
the enlargement process, the risks of politicization are bound to increase, which in turn puts the 
credibility and the perceived technocratic nature of the enlargement process at risk. Although the 
Commission as the executive arm of the European Union should take a distinctively technocratic 
approach to enlargement, it naturally acts as an institution in a network of other European institutions 
— most notably the Council of the European Union— and its decision-making processes regarding 
enlargement do not take place in a sealed-off environment. Although by design, the Commission is the 
most detached and most technocratic player in the European polity, it also “embodies the tensions 
between technocratic, insulated decision making and democratically responsive supranational 
governance” (Rauh, 3). Furthermore, even though the European Commission drafts its own progress 
reports and membership application opinions, to a large extent it also relies on policy contributions of 
individual member states, external consultants, and the advice of international organizations such as the 
IMF, the World Bank, and the OSCE. The comparative analytical section of this thesis will explore how 
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the Commission’s application of conditionality vis-à-vis Serbia and Macedonia has been haphazard at 
best. 
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THE (DIS)INCENTIVES OF COMPLIANCE: EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES AND DOMESTIC POLICY 
PREFERENCES 
The normative pressures of Europeanization have managed to transform Central Europe not only 
because of the region’s long-standing resistance to authoritarian rule. Several studies have revealed that 
international reform efforts in Central-Eastern Europe have also been successful because of the 
‘inspiring’ role of the European Union, and the possibility to make reform-oriented coalitions with it 
(Jacoby 2006, Kelley 2004). With an inspired populace and prospective member states willing to enter 
into a political coalition with the European Union, formal adoption of reforms proceeded rather 
smoothly in most of Central-Eastern Europe. Political elites in most of Central-Eastern Europe faced 
relatively little opposition to the far-reaching reforms that were necessary after the fall of Communism. 
In a political context where the pro-European alignment of political elites is less obvious however, norms 
and values form much less of an accelerative factor. Indeed, as Judith G. Kelley concludes in her study of 
Europeanization in Central-Eastern Europe, “normative pressure alone is decreasingly effective as the 
domestic and institutional policy preferences diverge” (176). Hughes, Sasses and Gordon have also 
underscored the importance of domestic policy preferences in the enlargement process in Central-
Eastern Europe, observing that “domestic institutional choices made during the early transition period 
outweigh and actually constrain the importance of external factors during enlargement” (8). When the 
institutional preferences of the European Union and domestic leadership are at odds, the prospects of a 
fruitful coalition remain low. This can have a dramatic impact on the pace of an acceding state’s 
accession process. 
 In the context of the Western Balkans however, we may extend upon this notion and suggest 
that reform efforts— especially when brought about by institutional policy preferences that lack an 
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inherent, visible, and credible reward structure — can have the adverse effect of reinforcing 
undemocratic power structures in the target country. The clientelist and informal power structures that 
are prevalent in the Western Balkans have appeared to be resistant to socialization processes, in which 
the importance of normative pressure is emphasized and a mutually reinforcing reform dynamic 
between external actors and domestic policy preferences is likely to emerge. Crucial reforms instigated 
by the enlargement process, for example in restructuring the judiciary and the strengthening of civil 
society, often go against the domestic policy preferences in regimes featuring a high level of clientelism, 
and — as the case of Macedonia will show — can even be interpreted as threatening the social fabric 
and stability of a target state. This ‘hostile’ reception of EU influence has the potential to derail a 
country’s accession process, especially when the perceived domestic gain of reforms do not realistically 
warrant any short-term political commitment to the process. Such has also been the case in Serbia, 
where attempts at democratization and deconstruction of the clientelist political system were severely 
hamstrung by tough political conditionalities imposed on the country by individual EU member states. 
Only when Serbia’s European perspective appeared brighter on the horizon due to its eventual 
compliance with the ICTY did the domestic political calculation shift in favor of compliance, which in turn 
allowed for rapid advancement in the enlargement process. The comparison between Serbia and 
Macedonia will reveal that a credible membership perspective4 and favorable domestic policy 
preferences are intrinsically linked by the laws of circular causation.  
 Both Serbia’s and Macedonia’s incentive structures have to a large extent been determined by 
                                                          
4 How to assess the credibility of a membership (European) perspective? This thesis builds on the notion that 
membership perspective should be visualized as a continuum instead of in absolute terms. The credibility of this 
perspective is partly determined by the reasonableness of the conditionality linked with it. If Kosovo’s perspective 
would be tied to recognition by all EU-member states, we can hardly assume the perspective to be credible, given 
the existence of five non-recognizing EU-member states. With regards to Macedonia and Serbia, the credibility of 
the perspective is similarly determined by the attainability of the conditions set, but also by the political 
environment in which the conditions are issued. In a scenario where the external political climate is hostile and the 
conditions set are politically unfeasible (or pragmatically unattainable) the credibility of the perspective should be 
put in doubt.   
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the external veto players of the enlargement process. The unanimous voting requirement in the Council 
of the European Union has held these countries back in different stages of the enlargement process. The 
existence of veto players is arguably the strongest disincentive to compliance with EU demands, for a 
variety of reasons. First of all, veto players allow domestic political elites to externalize their own 
political responsibility in the accession process. Because of their uncompromising nature, veto players 
are often domestically perceived as unjust or inherently biased, they allow political elites to blame their 
own non-commitment to reforms on the perceived unjustness of the enlargement procedure. The 
avoidance of responsibility in turn leads to an effect closely reminiscent of rallying ‘round the flag’, in 
which the veto player is politically ostracized by the forces of nationalism that the veto player has 
unwillingly helped to strengthen. Without a break in this cyclical process, the veto player’s veto may 
reinforce nationalist sentiment to such an extent that the domestic adoption cost of compliance with EU 
demands reaches a level that renders it politically very difficult for domestic political elites to overcome 
the obstacle that caused the veto in the first place.    
 Veto players also undermine the rewards that are driving much of the accession process in the 
Western Balkans. The accession model does not explicitly address the effects of a prolonged veto on the 
accessibility of rewards that are necessary for the accession procedure to sustain momentum. 
Overcoming the issue of veto players undermining the reward structure requires creative, ad-hoc 
political intervention from the European Commission. The Commission has tried to counter the loss of 
momentum over the vetoes cast with regard to the accession process of Macedonia by starting a High 
Level Dialogue in 2012, three years after Greece first objected to the start of accession negotiations with 
the country. The probability of the High Level Dialogue acting as a successful substitute to the important 
reward of starting accession negotiations was already low in 2012, and Macedonia’s further backsliding 
has revealed that the success of such an ad-hoc mechanism is to a large extent dependent on its 
credibility, which in turn is shaped by the level of alignment of the mechanism with the existing 
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incentive structure. When the mechanism is not deemed credible by the actors that bear responsibility 
for the implementation of reforms to guarantee the momentum of the accession process, the veto 
player has not only succeeded in obstructing a prospective member state’s path towards accession, but 
has also derailed the original incentive structure to such an extent that it will take a momentous level of 
commitment by the Commission to overcome the impasse. Hence, the Commission has repeatedly 
stated its desire for Greece to lift its veto as opposed to accepting the veto as a given and tried to 
continue the accession process by working around it (European Commission Enlargement Strategy 2009, 
2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014). 
 This brief reflection on the accession process served to highlight how complex the entire 
procedure has become since it was first envisioned for Central-Eastern Europe by the European 
Community after the fall of Communism. It also highlights how political the process has become now the 
different actors involved have learned the lessons of earlier enlargement waves, most notably that of 
the necessity to use political conditionality prior to the accession of new member states. Differentiation 
of political conditionality and the emergence of tactical vetoing are important developments that 
undermine the perceived technocratic nature of Enlargement. In the following section, it will become 
clear how these developments have contributed to the diverging levels of EU-accession progress in 
Macedonia and in Serbia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 24 
 
 
MACEDONIA’S EU ACCESSION: FROM THE ARBITRATION COMMISSION TO THE PRZHINO AGREEMENT  
Strengthening diplomatic relations with the European Union has been a strategic priority of the Republic 
of Macedonia ever since it declared its independence from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 
1991. From the outset, this strategic priority was determined by Macedonia’s security concerns. With 
war raging in Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and tensions rising in Serbia’s autonomous province of 
Kosovo, the international community feared that an outbreak of conflict in Macedonia would be 
inevitable. Like its northern ex-Yugoslav neighbors, the Republic of Macedonia features a delicate 
multiethnic population pattern, with the sizeable Albanian minority making up about a quarter of the 
country’s population. The Macedonian-Albanian minority is distinct from the ethnic Macedonian 
majority on the basis of religion and language; whereas ethnic Albanians in Macedonia are 
predominantly Muslim and speak the Albanian language as their mother tongue, ethnic Macedonians 
are predominantly Christian-Orthodox and speak Macedonian. Although many Macedonian-Albanians 
have adopted Macedonian as a second language, the Albanian language is unintelligible to ethnic 
Macedonians, further establishing the cultural divide. Although Macedonia’s ethnic divisions do not 
constitute a security concern an sich, the international community aptly realized that the violent 
collapse of Yugoslavia elsewhere in the region could easily form a precursor to conflict in Macedonia. 
Therefore, in 1992, the United Nations decided to expand its United Nations Protection Force, which 
was initially deployed to Croatia, to the Albanian-Macedonian border, and the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) established a spillover prevention mission in Skopje, both with the 
intention to prevent an outbreak of conflict in Macedonia.  
 In light of these concerns, the Council of Ministers of the European Economic Community (EEC) 
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in 1991 sought the advice of the Arbitration Commission on the Conference on Yugoslavia, whose task it 
was to assess the legality of recognizing the new republics that emerged from the SFRY.  The Arbitration 
Commission suggested recognition of Macedonia’s independence after certain pre-conditions had been 
met. These pre-conditions in hindsight marked the start of EU conditionality vis-à-vis Macedonia. The 
following three pre-conditions were set by the Arbitration Commission (Ramet, 185): 
- Adoption of amendments to the constitution (Article and Article 49) that 
ensured the respect for existing state borders 
- Declaring explicitly that the country possessed no territorial pretensions toward 
any of its neighbors 
- Assuring explicitly that the country would abstain from interfering in the 
internal affairs of the Hellenic Republic 
Naturally, these pre-conditions were the result of extensive diplomatic pressure from Greece on the 
Arbitration Commission. Macedonia however immediately5 followed suit and adapted the constitution, 
declared that it did not hold any territorial pretensions, and assured Greece that it would abstain from 
interfering in its internal affairs. Despite Macedonia’s quick fulfillment of the Arbitration Commission’s 
demands, the EEC did not follow up the commission’s opinion and decided not to recognize Macedonia’s 
independence.  Six months after the advice of the Arbitration Commission had been issued, the Council 
issued a statement including a new precondition that was absent in the conclusions of the Arbitration 
Commission: 
The European Council reiterates the position taken by the Community and its member 
states in Guimaraes (Portugal) on the request of the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia to be recognized as an independent State. It expresses it readiness to 
recognize that republic within its existing borders according to their declaration on 16 
December 1991 under a name which does not include the term Macedonia. It 
furthermore considers the border of this republic as inviolable and guaranteed in 
accordance with the principles of the UN Charter and the Charter of Paris (European 
Council Lisbon, 1992).  
                                                          
5 The Macedonian parliament adopted the constitutional changes and fulfilled all demands within three weeks 
after they had been set by the Arbitration Commission (December 16, 1991 – January 6, 1992) (Ripiloski, 70).  
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The Lisbon Declaration further exacerbated tensions in Macedonia. The nationalistic Internal 
Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-
DPMNE), which had won the first multi-party elections in 1990, had been representing Macedonian 
independence as the first step towards reunification of a “Greater Macedonia” (Ripiloski, 43). VMRO-
DPMNE’s efforts to frame the independence question in nationalistic terms were highly successful, and 
a nationalistic ‘fever’ gripped the country in 1992. More than a hundred thousand Macedonians 
demonstrated against the Lisbon Declaration in July 1992, which in turn increased Greek hostility to its 
northern neighbor. Furthermore, the public outcry had the side effect of hindering the technical 
government in its efforts to sustain interethnic relations between Albanians and Macedonians, as 
“giving in” to the demands of the Albanian minority became increasingly politically unfeasible as a result 
of the nationalism that had been rising since the name dispute had become a prominent political 
mobilization tool (Ahrens 2006 in Ripiloski, 43). The conditionality introduced in the Lisbon Declaration 
therefore directly affected the security environment in Macedonia in a negative way and also 
institutionalized the name dispute on a European level. Furthermore, the decision of the Council to 
sidestep the recommendation of the Arbitration Commission in hindsight also set the stage for the 
interinstitutional disagreement between the Council and the European Commission regarding 
Macedonia in the years to come. 
 In 1997, the European Community signed a cooperation agreement with the Republic of 
Macedonia under the country’s referential name (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia). It aimed 
to promote cooperation in the fields of transport and trade, and was accompanied by a financial 
protocol for the period 1996-2000 that included a 150 million euro loan from the European Investment 
Bank, meant for infrastructural development that would “ensure uninterrupted links between the 
member states and the Community” (Cooperation Agreement Macedonia, 1997). In the absence of the 
Stabilization and Association framework that would be established a few years later, the cooperation 
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agreement was primarily intended to prevent an interruption of international trade along the critical 
Corridor X that links Skopje with Thessaloniki. The Greek-Macedonian border had been subject to Greek 
economic embargoes and closures throughout the 1990s, which had a severe impact on the 
Macedonian economy (Ripiloski, 40). The agreement sought to facilitate trade along this corridor, but it 
did not address the rising political tensions in the country between Macedonians and Albanians. The 
cooperation between the Community and the Republic of Macedonia was purely financial at this point, 
exclusively focusing on trade relations and the easing of import of goods deemed interesting for the 
Community, such as “wines and spirits” (Cooperation Agreement Macedonia, 1997).  
 On March 21, 2001, the European Union and its member states signed the Stabilization and 
Association Agreement with Macedonia as part of the Stabilization and Association Process. By this date 
however, Macedonia had already seen intense interethnic clashes and was on the brink of a civil war. 
The 2001 conflict affirmed the concerns that the international community had voiced ever since 
Macedonia’s independence. Rising nationalism within Macedonia, aggravated by the economic crises 
resulting from the Greek trade embargoes, had had a detrimental effect on interethnic relations. The 
1999 war in nearby Kosovo furthermore had caused an unprecedented refugee wave which drastically 
altered Macedonia’s ethnic makeup. The success of the Kosovo Liberation Army in bringing down 
Serbian rule over Kosovo served as an inspiration for KLA affiliates in Macedonia. The European Union 
recognized the need to step up its engagement with Macedonia, — an engagement that so far had been 
characterized by Greek demands — primarily because of the necessity to prevent another war in the 
unstable Balkans.  
 Later that year in August, the European Union took the lead in bringing about a negotiated 
peace settlement. The Ohrid Framework Agreement was brokered by Francois Leotard on behalf of the 
European Union and James Pardew as a representative of the United States, in close cooperation with 
the leaders of the most important Albanian and Macedonian political parties in Macedonia. The 
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agreement called for another amendment to the preamble of the constitution — which had been 
ignored by the Arbitration Commission — in order to declare the Republic of Macedonia a state of all its 
citizens, as opposed to a state “of the Macedonian people […] and the Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, Roma 
and other nationalities” (Brunnbauer, 4). The agreement also established Albanian as an official 
language on the central state level, as well as on the municipal level in municipalities where more than a 
fifth of the population spoke Albanian. It furthermore provided for stronger participation of Albanians in 
public institutions, equitable representation in the police apparatus, and allowed for tertiary education 
in the Albanian language (Ohrid Framework Agreement).  
 Implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) formed the cornerstone of relations 
between the European Union and the Republic of Macedonia in the years to come. The primacy the 
OFA’s implementation enjoyed is probably the main reason why Macedonia was the first country in the 
region to have its Stabilization and Association Agreement ratified by all EU member states. As the 
country had narrowly avoided a full-scale civil war, EU member states arguably prioritized security 
concerns over a rigorous assessment of whether the SAA should be ratified. Additional conditionality 
was not formally imposed on Macedonia in this stage of the accession process, in part due to growing 
disillusionment within the European Union with Greece’s uncompromising stance (Glenny, 240). 
Radmila Sekerinska, the Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration from 2002 to 2006, affirms that 
Macedonia’s progress towards EU accession was —in these years— for the most part linked to 
successful implementation of the OFA:  
When politicians and experts read the Ohrid agreement, they said: ‘Oh my God, this 
would be difficult to implement even in a richer, stronger and more mature country. 
And it is difficult to do it in few years.' So they said: ‘Ok, if you do at least this, then 
you'll show that Macedonia can actually progress in the future.' And we took it for 
granted and we said: ‘OK, if it's the Ohrid Agreement [that counts] then so be it.' We 
were aware that Macedonia would not be a perfect candidate country in a few years, 
but the Ohrid Agreement was the big argument in our favour because it became clear in 
2005 that Macedonia has implemented the most difficult parts of the Ohrid Agreement 
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against all odds and against all predictions. (The Ohrid Agreement and its 
Implementation, 2006) 
Rapid implementation of the agreement followed. The number of Albanians in the police force 
sextupled in this period; Albanian participation in the armed forces quadrupled; Albanian universities 
faced little resistance in offering an Albanian language curriculum; and the number of Albanians enrolled 
in university education rose from 2,285 in 2001 to more than 9,540 in 2005 (The Ohrid Agreement and 
its Implementation, 2006). 
 Formally, Macedonia’s EU accession progress in this phase required far more than successful 
implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, which in line with the established accession 
framework should have been considered an instance of political conditionality. The result of the primacy 
that implementation of the OFA received was however that implementation of the OFA to a large extent 
substituted the accession framework established under the SAA. Macedonia was highly aware of this 
political reality, and submitted its EU membership bid to the Council on 22 March 2004 in the hope that 
successful implementation of the agreement would suffice to move on to the next stage of the process. 
The European Commission set out to analyze the application on the basis of the country’s capacity to 
meet the Copenhagen Criteria and the conditions set for the Stabilization and Association Process. The 
Commission confirmed that the main challenge for the country’s political stability since it became 
independent was the 2001 crisis (Conclusions on FYROM 2005, 3), and concluded that the new 
legislative framework had been implemented “effectively” (ibid. 3). With regard to other political criteria 
however, the Commission noted the “serious irregularities of the 2005 local elections,”6 the abstaining 
                                                          
6 “The local elections in 2005 displayed a series of serious irregularities,” according to the European Commission. 
These irregularities followed on irregularities during the general elections in 2002. In reaction to the elections in 
2002, OSCE-ODIHR had issued a list of recommendations for Macedonia to implement before the 2005 elections, 
which is also noted as a soft conditionality in the EU Progress Report of 2005. The implementation of these 
recommendations did not occur, but did not restrain the European Commission in recommending Macedonia’s EU 
candidacy. This sidestepping of conditionality based on free and fair elections stands in sharp contrast with the 
very tough election conditionality imposed on Macedonia as a result of the Przhino Agreement of 2016 and is a 
clear act of conditionality differentiation in a temporal context. 
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of one opposition party from Parliament, and the high level of corruption that affected many aspects of 
the economic, social, and political life of the country (ibid. 4). Similar concerns continue to appear in 
Macedonia’s progress reports up until today. In its conclusion, the Commission however 
counterintuitively concluded the following: 
In the light of these considerations, and taking into account, in particular, the 
substantial progress made by the country in completing the legislative framework 
related to the Ohrid Framework Agreement of 2001, and following four years of 
implementation of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (including the 
application of its trade related provisions in the form of an Interim Agreement) the 
Commission recommends that the Council should grant the status of candidate country 
to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. This status is a political recognition of a 
closer relationship between the EU and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on 
its way towards membership. (ibid. 7, emphasis mine) 
In December 2005, only one month after the publication of the Commission’s recommendation, the 
Council heeded the Commission’s advice and granted Macedonia its candidate status. Even though 
Greece could have deferred a unanimous Council decision, it chose not to do so, presumably under 
diplomatic pressure from influential EU member states. 
 The granting of candidate status by the end of 2005 marked the high point of Macedonia’s EU 
accession ‘momentum.’ Macedonia’s momentum by the end of 2005 was a product of its relatively 
successful implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement and the political willingness within the 
European Union to accelerate the pace of accession. The European context here is one in which 
enlargement fatigue had only started to set in. In 2004 ten new member states joined the European 
Union, most of whom shared a historical legacy of communism with the former Yugoslavia. It was only 
natural for the newly acceding states not to hinder aspirant member states so shortly after their own 
accession to the European Union. The rejection of the European Constitution in referenda in France and 
the Netherlands in 2005 set the stage for growing Euroscepticism in the decade to come, but by the end 
of 2005 these forces were still relatively marginalized on the European stage. Furthermore, the delay 
that Romania and Bulgaria experienced in acceding to the European Union was still interpreted in a 
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constructive fashion, with many EU member states not willing to impose new conditionalities on these 
two aspirant member states. The conclusion of accession negotiations with Bulgaria was for example 
already confirmed in December 2004, when the Council decided to only “strictly monitor” Bulgaria’s 
progress before it eventually acceded to the EU in January 2007 (Brussels European Council, 2004). In 
hindsight, the fact that Bulgaria is still supervised under a safeguard clause more than eight years later 
renders the 2004 decision not to impose new conditionalities highly counterintuitive. It indicates that 
accession momentum is as much shaped by the attitude of the aspirant member state as by the 
European political climate at the time. 
 Unfortunately for Macedonia’s EU-accession process, both of these factors have taken a 
dramatic hit since the country received its candidacy in 2005. Many international commentators have 
attributed the inversion of momentum to a change in domestic policy preferences and a rise in 
authoritarian governing since VMRO-DPMNE won the elections in 2006 and Nikola Gruevski came to 
power (Byrne 2015, Fouere 2015, Dimitrov and Fouere 2015, Stavrevska 2015, Taleski 2012). Such a 
perspective however underemphasizes the ‘artificial’ nature of the momentum created post-2001, 
downplays how political disagreement within the European Union and in NATO have significantly altered 
the domestic adoption costs of Euro-Atlantic integration, and ignore the inconsistent application of EU-
conditionality in the Western Balkans. 
 Gruevski — who was Minister of Finance from 1998 to 2002 — was elected in 2006 on a 
platform calling for further stabilization, commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration, and most 
importantly, economic revitalization. As Minister of Finance, he introduced the Value Added Tax in 
Macedonia, improved conditions for private sector development by lowering customs tariffs and taxes, 
denationalized the telecommunication and oil industries, and drastically reduced public administration 
staffing (Address by FYROM Minister of Finance, 2002). Building on his political profile as a reformer, 
Prime Minister Gruevski initially set out to accelerate the liberalization of the Macedonian economy. 
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Simultaneously however, the new VMRO-DPMNE-led government, probably in an effort to appeal to its 
less moderate wing, also made an important mistake by answering the lifting of Greek obstructionism in 
the Council with increased Macedonian nationalism. Although VMRO-DPMNE had not been running on 
an explicitly nationalistic agenda in the 2006 elections (as opposed to the two Albanian parties)7, the 
party’s ideological dependency on the historical Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization 
(IMRO) naturally invites for nationalistic policy preferences. The most apparent move that angered 
Greece and set in motion renewed diplomatic tensions was the announcement of the renaming of 
Skopje’s airport to “Alexander the Great” airport by the end of 2006. Other symbolic moves that 
angered the Greek government were revisions made in Macedonian schoolbooks describing the 
continual lineage of the Macedonian people and VMRO-DPMNE’s inclination to not shy away from 
ultranationalist photo opportunities, such as the laying of a wreath on a monument to which a map of 
the so-called “Greater Macedonia” was attached (Bakoyannis, 2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7 The 2006 elections featured relatively little nationalistic appeals on the ethnic-Macedonian side. However, the 
campaigns of the Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA) and the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI) in 2006 
featured excessive nationalism, with the elections itself marred by intra-Albanian violence (OSCE/ODIHR FYROM 
Election Observation Mission Final Report, 2006). 
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“Ç’EST LE NOM!” 
 The renewed Greek-Macedonian tensions culminated in the Greek insistence not to provide 
Macedonia an invitation to join NATO at the 20th NATO Summit in Bucharest in April 2008. In hindsight, 
this decision may as well have marked the beginning of Macedonia’s backsliding in the EU accession 
process. Whereas the European Commission issued a critical progress report in 2006, citing the “slow 
pace” of reforms (European Commission Enlargement Strategy 2006, 11), in 2007 the language became 
a bit more optimistic, with the Commission citing “some progress” in addressing political criteria and 
“gradual implementation” of the pivotal public administration reform. The Commission however also 
notes in 2007 that “actions which would negatively affect good neighborly relations should be avoided,” 
clearly referring to the renewed diplomatic tensions between Greece and Macedonia (European 
Commission Enlargement Strategy 2007, 38). In 2008, the wording remained relatively encouraging, 
with the Commission citing that “progress has been made in a number of key areas […] in particular as 
regards judicial reform, police reform, and implementation of the requirements under the Stabilization 
and Association Agreement” (European Commission Enlargement Strategy 2008, 4). However, in 2008 
the Commission also noted that Macedonia “needs to ensure the holding of free and fair elections and 
to improve the dialogue between major political parties and actors” (ibid. 14). This condition —which 
was by no means new; the same wording already came to the surface in 2004 and 2006 and has become 
the EU’s main conditionality vis-à-vis Macedonia by 2016 — appears to be crucial, given the first 
paragraph and sentence of the Commission’s conclusion in 2009 in which it recommends the start of 
negotiations: 
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The presidential and local elections of 2009 met most international standards and most 
of the recommendations of the OSCE/ODIHR from previous elections have been 
implemented. Political dialogue has improved: the governing coalition is stable, the 
political climate is more cooperative and the parliament is more effective. The key 
Accession Partnership priorities regarding the reform of the police, the judiciary, public 
administration and corruption have been substantially addressed. On this basis, and in 
view of the overall progress of reforms, the Commission considers that the country 
sufficiently fulfils the political criteria. (European Commission Enlargement Strategy 
2009, emphasis mine) 
Comparing the Commission’s progress report of 2005 (in which the Commission recommended 
Macedonia’s candidacy to the Council) with the Commission’s conclusions of 2009 (in which it 
recommended the start of accession negotiations to the Council) delivers a paradoxical result. Whereas 
Macedonia received the candidacy recommendation in spite of “serious irregularities” during the local 
elections in 2005 (European Commission Enlargement Strategy 2005, 4), in 2009 the Commission 
considered the implementation of OSCE/ODIHR recommendations an important prerequisite for the 
start of accession negotiations. This inconsistency on the one hand confirms the assertion that security 
concerns and successful implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement held primacy over free and 
fair elections in 2005. Additionally however, it indicates the political sensitiveness of the Commission, 
which was very well aware that a positive recommendation could have backfired immensely if it had 
been issued in 2008, shortly after the NATO Summit in Bucharest, at the height of Macedonian-Greek 
animosity. In 2008, French Foreign Minister Kouchner confirmed that such sentiments played a very 
important role in the input that France delivered for Macedonia’s 2008 progress report: 
 The problem of Macedonia, it’s the name […] Frankly, you can ask me about visas and 
about progress all you like; as long as the name issue is not solved, you are knocking on 
the wrong door. This problem must be solved. (Vucheva 2008) 
 There is another viable reason to believe that the Commission’s decision to recommend the 
opening of accession negotiations in 2009 instead of 2008 could be linked with political developments 
outside Macedonia. In June 2009, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), headed by George 
Papandreou — the son of Andreas Papandreou, who was Prime Minister of Greece when relations hit a 
 35 
low in the 1990s — decisively won the European Parliament elections in Greece, and was expected to 
sweep the upcoming general elections in October 2009. The conservative New Democracy party — 
Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyannis’ party — was tracing PASOK in the polls, and a change of political 
leadership in Greece was highly probable. The Commission released its conclusion on Macedonia short 
of two weeks after the general elections in Greece had taken place, and a week after the installment of 
Papandreou’s new cabinet (which included Papandreou as the new Minister of Foreign Affairs8). If we 
understand the Commission to indeed be a political actor in a complex network of European institutions 
— and as an institution interested in maximizing its own political credibility — the political opening 
offered by a new Papandreou government could make a crucial difference in the reception of the 
Commission’s positive recommendation by the Council. 
 Even though the change in political leadership in Greece may have been an additional 
encouragement for the Commission to issue a positive recommendation for Macedonia, the 
recommendation still backfired when the foreign ministers of the European Union were not able to 
reach a compromise on a Council decision in December 2009. Although Sweden — which held the EU-
presidency at the time — initially prepared a draft conclusion in which it proposed to postpone a 
decision until March 2010, Papandreou insisted that the Council had to postpone its decision on 
Macedonia’s start of accession negotiations until a solution to the name dispute had been reached 
(BalkanInsight, 2009). Due to the Council’s unanimity requirement in this stage of the enlargement 
process, no decision on the start of accession negotiations with Macedonia could be made, and the 
Council was forced to postpone its decision indefinitely. A disappointed Gruevski noted after the 
meeting that “Greece had done big political damage, and history will prove this” (ibid.). 
 Gruevski’s warning words can now be considered of prophetic value. Even though he held the 
                                                          
8 George Papandreou was acting Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece from 6 October 2009 until 7 September 
2010, when he was succeeded by his Alternate Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dimitrios Droutsas.  
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most powerful political position in Macedonia for nearly ten years, and was therefore able to shape the 
direction of the country for a decade, the Greek veto in the Council delivered an enormous blow to the 
credibility of the EU in Macedonia. The impact of the veto was twofold: Firstly, it removed a major 
instrument for securing compliance from the EU’s toolbox (Hughes 2012, 89), and secondly, the veto to 
a large extent inverted the incentives to comply with the Commission’s demands. 
 The first impact of the veto on Macedonia’s EU accession progress (the removal of a credible 
membership perspective) has been resoundingly clear. Following its first recommendation in 2009, the 
European Commission recommended the start of accession negotiations with Macedonia subsequently 
in 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014. As of 2016, the Council has yet to make a decision on all of these 
recommendations. In 2011, already noticing that European influence in Macedonia was waning, the 
Commission stated the following in its conclusion, underscoring the importance of credibility: 
The Commission notes that the Council has not been able to follow up on the 
Commission recommendation dating from 2009 for opening accession negotiations with 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Moving the accession process of this 
country to its next stage will benefit the momentum of reforms and the climate of inter-
ethnic relations, and will impact positively on the region. The dispute between Greece 
and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia over the name of the latter has 
remained unresolved for almost two decades. A dialogue under the auspices of the UN 
has been ongoing since the 1990s and it is complemented since 2009 by bilateral 
contacts, including at Prime Ministerial level. However, these processes have yet to yield 
results. Maintaining good neighborly relations, including a negotiated and mutually 
acceptable solution to the name issue, under the auspices of the UN, remains essential. 
The Commission underlines the need for a redoubling of efforts for a solution without 
further delay. It also recalls that actions and statements that could negatively impact on 
good neighborly relations should be avoided. A solution to the name issue is long 
overdue. (European Commission Enlargement Strategy 2011, 14) 
In an effort to overcome the impasse, the European Union in 2012 launched the aforementioned High-
Level Accession Dialogue with Macedonia. The goal of the dialogue was to enhance the EU’s credibility 
in the country by giving it an alternative framework to push progress in strategic priority areas — such 
as the judiciary and the establishment Rule of Law — prior to the formal start of negotiations. Without 
the membership perspective however, the High-Level Accession Dialogue failed to be a determining 
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factor in preventing Macedonia’s backsliding (Karadjoski 2015). The Commission was very well aware of 
this in its reflections on the alternative framework in its 2013 conclusions: 
The High Level Accession Dialogue is a useful tool which will continue to focus on key 
issues, including good neighborly relations, but it cannot replace the accession 
negotiations (European Commission Enlargement Strategy 2013, 17). 
The Commission furthermore dramatically altered its language in 2013 in an unusual effort to convince 
the Council that another postponement could prove disastrous for the country: 
This is the fifth time the Commission recommends the opening of accession negotiations 
with this country. No decision has been taken by the Council to date. Failure to act on 
this recommendation poses potentially serious challenges to the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia and to the EU. This calls into question the credibility of the 
enlargement process, which is based on clear conditionality and the principle of own 
merits. The lack of a credible EU perspective puts at risk the sustainability of the 
country’s reform efforts.  
 
The Commission reiterates its intention to present without delay a proposal for a 
negotiating framework, which takes into account the need to solve the name issue at an 
early stage of accession negotiations, and will carry out the process of analytical 
examination of the EU acquis beginning with the chapters on the judiciary and 
fundamental rights, and justice, freedom and security. The Commission considers that, if 
the screening and the Council discussions on the negotiating framework were under 
way, the necessary momentum could be created which would support finding a 
negotiated and mutually accepted solution to the name issue even before negotiating 
chapters are opened. (European Commission Enlargement Strategy 2013, 18) 
 The European Commission’s regret over the inconclusiveness of the Council was shared by the 
Macedonian government, which ever since the first veto in 2009 has attempted to consolidate its power 
outside of the framework of EU accession. This alternative consolidation of political power speaks to the 
assumption made in the first part of this thesis: That reform efforts may have the adverse effect of 
consolidating authoritarian structures if these efforts are not met with a credible and clearly visible 
membership perspective. In Macedonia, the continuous indecision of the Council has allowed the 
Macedonian government to set up a political narrative in which outside actors bear sole responsibility 
for the country’s plights. For example, when the largest opposition party in Macedonia in 2014 revealed 
that the Gruevski regime conducted widespread wiretapping on more than 20,000 people in the country 
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in order to sustain its political power, the government responded by naming opposition leader Zoran 
Zaev a “puppet of foreign services” (BalkanInsight, 2015). Similarly, demonstrators, intellectuals, and 
even EU mediators9 have been condemned by official government channels for their connections with 
George Soros, or are simply called out for acting ‘Greek.’ This nationalistic condemnation strategy would 
bear far less popular credibility if the VMRO-DPMNE-led governments had not been able to base these 
narratives on the European credibility deficit that emerged as a result of the successive Greek vetoes in 
NATO and in the Council. Furthermore, it should be expected that in a scenario where Macedonia’s bid 
to join the EU had not been derailed by Greece, the regime would have been held more accountable for 
its increasingly authoritarian nature, given the fact that in such a scenario, a political alternative would 
have been able to rally for the European cause. Although this scenario has played out earlier in countries 
whose EU accession progress was severely stalled, — Mikuláš Dzurinda’s defeat of Vladimír Mečiar in 
1998 would be the closest analogy — the complete lack of a credible European perspective for 
Macedonia renders this political alternative highly unviable. The lack of perspective therefore not only 
hinders Macedonia’s EU accession, but reinforces anti-European sentiment, and has been an important 
tool in the consolidation of power under Gruevski.  
 In 2015, after six successive positive recommendations, the Commission decided to opt for a 
different strategy to prevent additional backsliding in Macedonia, in which it tried to realign 
Macedonia’s readiness to start EU-accession negotiations in terms of acquis conditionality with the 
political conditionality of adhering to the EU-brokered agreement struck in June 2015 (the Przhino 
Agreement) that attempted to overcome the deep political crisis in the country: 
The EU accession process of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia remains at an 
impasse. The revelations in the context of the wiretapping case have corroborated 
                                                          
9 Peter VanHoutte, the Belgian EU mediator leading inter-party talks prior to the early elections of 2016, was 
blocked from continuing mediation by VMRO-DPMNE after he had made satirical comments on the party’s stance 
in the mediations on his personal Twitter page. In an official party communication, VanHoutte was advised to 
spend his “90-day tourist visa” in a meaningful way, for example by writing a tourist guide and visiting the Museum 
of the Macedonian Revolutionary Struggle in Skopje (META, 2016).  
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earlier serious concerns of the Commission and others over political interference in the 
judiciary and the media, increasing politicization of state institutions and the conduct of 
elections. At the same time, the country maintains a high level of alignment with the 
acquis relative to where it is in the accession process. Political actors now need to 
concentrate fully on implementing the Commission's "Urgent Reform Priorities" and 
overcoming the political crisis […] It remains essential that decisive steps are taken 
towards resolving the ‘name issue’. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has 
been seriously affected by the refugee crisis, managing an influx of more than two 
hundred thousand third country nationals transiting its territory since the beginning of 
the year. In the light of the progress made so far in the implementation of the June/July 
political agreement, the Commission is prepared to extend its recommendation to open 
accession negotiations with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. This shall, 
however, be conditional on the continued implementation of the June/July political 
agreement and substantial progress in the implementation of the urgent reform 
priorities. This issue shall be addressed again after the elections. (European Commission 
Progress Report on Macedonia 2015) 
The drastic shift in the stance of the Commission is fueled by two developments. First of all, it is an 
effort to tie membership perspective to the political arrangement made in June 2015, in which the four 
largest political parties in Macedonia agreed to install a caretaker government without Gruevski, and 
hold early elections, with the caveat that those elections have to be free and fair. In a sense, this is an 
ironic requirement, given the fact that the Commission gave prevalence to successful implementation of 
the Ohrid Framework Agreement in 2005 over elections that clearly did not adhere to OSCE/ODIHR 
standards. The second development influencing the Commission’s different strategy is the fact that the 
political crisis in Macedonia in 2015 became linked with two major security crises: The enduring Syrian 
refugee crisis, and the reappearance of the Kosovar-Albanian insurgency movement, which led to 
warlike scenes and 18 casualties in the ethnically divided city of Kumanovo in May. Both events have led 
to a highly visible increase in EU engagement in Macedonia, with the aforementioned Przhino-
agreement as the clearest example. The first-ever issuance of a conditional recommendation to start 
accession negotiations only underscores how conditionality — at least in the case of Macedonia— can 
be utilized in near limitless fashion and is always bound to political circumstance.  
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SERBIA’S EU ACCESSION: COMMON EUROPEAN INTERESTS AND CONSTRUCTIVE AMBIGUITY 
How has the application of conditionality, and the role of the European Commission vis-à-vis the 
Council, been different in the case of Serbia? Having established that Macedonia’s backsliding is 
intrinsically linked with its loss of a European perspective, the example of Serbia highlights how the 
differentiation of conditionality and politicization of enlargement can also jumpstart a country’s 
accession process. 
 Serbia’s European perspective took off much later than that of Macedonia due to the country’s 
role in the breakup of Yugoslavia, the Bosnian and Croatian Wars, and the subsequent conflict in Kosovo. 
The violent legacy of Slobodan Milosevic’ rule left the European Union very hesitant to connect 
necessary democratization with the carrot of a European perspective. Henceforth, not the European 
Union but the United States was the main driver behind the initial push for democratization post-2000, 
long after UN sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) were lifted. It was also the 
United States — more specifically the Bush Jr. administration — that introduced the primacy of 
cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal on Yugoslavia (ICTY) as a condition for further 
financial aid. In her memoirs, Carla Del Ponte, the Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY from 1999 to 2008, 
argued that it took years of diplomatic pressure from the United States before the European Union 
started to introduce ICTY conditionality in its negotiations with FRY (Del Ponte, 152).  
 When the European Union established the Stabilization and Association Process in 1999, FRY 
was left out of the process due to the ongoing war in Kosovo. When FRY was invited to join the SAP in 
late 2000, cooperation with the ICTY did not yet form a political conditionality. As mentioned earlier, the 
Thessaloniki Summit of June 2003 marked the beginning of a clear EU perspective for the entire Western 
 41 
Balkans, including FRY, but ICTY cooperation was not yet tied to that perspective (Rajkovic, 85). In its 
feasibility study — which the EU conducts prior to the negotiation of an SAA — cooperation with the 
ICTY was also largely disregarded until a highly critical report on Serbia’s cooperation with the ICTY was 
published by the ICTY in 2004 (Dobbels, 9). In a response to this report, the EU decided to delay the 
finalization of the feasibility study, which stalled a possible recommendation by the Commission to start 
negotiations on the opening of the SAA. This delay marks the first instance in which the EU tied ‘full 
cooperation’ with the ICTY to progress in the EU accession process. Commissioner Olli Rehn shortly 
afterwards confirmed the new approach, noting that “serious progress on cooperation with the ICTY 
was a precondition for a positive assessment” (Rajkovic, 87). 
 The establishment of cooperation with the ICTY as political conditionality, first as part of the 
feasibility study, and later in negotiations over the SAA, coincides temporally with the primacy given to 
successful implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement with regards to Macedonia’s EU-
accession process. Furthermore, the granting of candidacy status to Macedonia and the start of 
accession negotiations with Croatia happened in the same year as the commencement of SAA 
negotiations with the now renamed State Union of Serbia and Montenegro10. All these rewards were 
put forward in spite of non-compliance with the established political conditions: Macedonia did not hold 
the fair and free elections that were required, Croatia did not arrest Ante Gotovina until after it had 
received the reward of starting accession negotiations, and Serbia — whose newly installed Kostunica-
led government had won elections on an anti-ICTY platform — also did very little to adhere to the new 
ICTY conditionality. With domestic developments clearly departing from the standards the EU had in 
mind for the Western Balkans in 2005, the favorable political climate within the EU at the time must 
                                                          
10 Referred to as Serbia for the remainder of this thesis. The EU adopted a two-track approach in 2005 in which it 
separated the accession paths of Serbia and of Montenegro for all purposes other than “the political part of the 
SAA.” In 2006, Montenegro declared its independence, which resulted in the further deconstruction of the shared 
SAA. 
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have played a determining role. In hindsight, it should be concluded that concerns over the stability of 
the Western Balkans, and the artificial creation of enlargement momentum — probably connected with 
the optimism surrounding the 2004 enlargement wave — trumped adherence to strict conditionality. 
 The case of Macedonia has shown that Greece reemerged as a veto player in Macedonia’s 
accession process at the Bucharest Summit of 2008 and in response to the first positive 
recommendation to start accession negotiations issued by the Commission in 2009. The case of Serbia 
here again parallels that of Macedonia (despite the different stages both countries were in at the time), 
as the negotiations over its SAA, conducted from 2005 to 2008, also saw the emergence of veto players. 
The emergence of veto players in Serbia’s accession process was however far less constraining on Serbia 
prior to 2008 due the common political interest of the more powerful EU-member states; a common 
interest that was — and still is — painfully absent with regards to Macedonia.  
 In 2006, the Netherlands became the only country within the Council that wanted to follow up 
the Commission’s recommendation, which had suggested to suspend all negotiations with Serbia if it did 
not improve its cooperation record with the ICTY. Diplomatic pressure from Germany however 
prevented this tough application of conditionality (Pridham, 466), and the Council decided to postpone 
its decision on Serbia’s SAA negotiations. In 2007, the Netherlands and Belgium stood strong with the 
Commission’s opinion that Serbia was “not fully cooperating with the ICTY” (European Commission 
Enlargement Strategy 2007, 46), and that the country was therefore not yet ready to sign the SAA. 
However, several member states (including Germany and France) wanted Serbia to move on towards 
the next stage of the accession process, arguing that signing of the SAA would boost the chances of a 
change in government in Serbia (Dobbels, 15).  
 Boris Tadic, who had been running on a pro-European platform, was leading in the polls by the 
end of 2007, and the reasoning of Germany and France was that the signing of the SAA would give Tadic 
the necessary momentum and enhance the EU’s credibility prior to the presidential elections that would 
 43 
take place a couple of weeks later. If Tadic would indeed be re-elected as Serbia’s president, this would 
form a precedent for a strong pro-European showing in the general elections that followed in May. This 
argument proved effective: The two veto players in the Council were overruled through diplomatic 
pressure, and the European Union initialed the signing of Serbia’s SAA. Boris Tadic was indeed re-elected 
as president, and his Democratic Party also won the subsequent parliamentary elections. The 
Netherlands, frustrated over the inconsistent application of conditionality (De Wereldomroep, 2008), 
and personally involved in the matter because of its role in the Srebrenica massacre of 1995, then 
decided to take matters into its own hands, and stalled the Dutch ratification of Serbia’s SAA until Serbia 
had achieved full cooperation with the ICTY. When Serbia arrested the last two important fugitives —
Ratko Mladic and Goran Hadzic —in 2011, the Netherlands followed suit and ratified the SAA, which 
paved the way for the granting of candidacy in 2012.  
 A comparison focusing on the role of veto players in the accession procedures of Macedonia and 
Serbia inevitably highlights how a strong common European interest may trump a veto player in the 
Council, even if that also means neglecting the advice of the European Commission. Whereas Macedonia 
received five positive recommendations to start accession negotiations, the Commission issued three 
negative advices concerning Serbia’s progress in SAA-negotiations. The irony here is obvious; the Council 
managed to overcome a veto — silently supported by multiple member states — that was instigated in 
order to adhere to political conditionality in the case of Serbia, but it has not actively opposed five 
consecutive vetoes that have undermined the credibility of the enlargement process and of the 
Commission, and clearly accelerated backsliding. The cynical conclusion of this comparison is that 
sustaining accession momentum with Macedonia does not form a strong common European interest, 
whereas sustaining accession momentum with Serbia does.  
 After the arrest of Mladic and Hadzic, and following Kosovo’s declaration of independence, 
conditionality vis-à-vis Serbia shifted from ICTY focused to ‘normalization focused’ (Galicic, 9). The 
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European Union never explicitly demanded a hard political conditionality regarding Serbia’s dispute with 
Kosovo over its status. Realizing that demanding recognition of Kosovo’s statehood would undermine, if 
not completely derail Serbia’s accession process, the EU has taken a constructively ambiguous stance on 
Serbia – Kosovo relations (Reljic, 1). In 2015, the EU opened the first two chapters of the acquis; Chapter 
32 on financial control and Chapter 35 — normally reserved for ‘other issues’ — on normalizing relations 
with Kosovo. The philosophy behind the early opening of Chapter 35 is that this would contribute to 
“fresh momentum” and that it “should have a positive and concrete impact on the everyday life of 
citizens in both Kosovo and Serbia” (European Commission Enlargement Strategy 2015, 20). 
Normalization of relations of Kosovo, together with the judicial and Rule of Law-based reforms in 
Chapters 23 and 24, are deemed critical in Serbia’s future EU-accession process (EurActiv, 2015). 
 What normalization entails, and when it has been achieved, has deliberately been left unclear, 
in order not to make any demands that could potentially backfire if Serbia is unable to follow them up. 
At the same time, the EU is well aware that elaboration of its conditionality concerning Serbia’s relations 
with Kosovo could potentially open an avenue in which Kosovo could unilaterally prevent Serbia’s EU 
accession progress by refusing to normalize relations. Opposition parties in Kosovo, most notably the 
radical Vetevendosje party, have already expressed their desire to stall Serbia’s EU accession wherever 
they can (KosovaPress, 2015), in similar fashion as conservative parties in Greece with regards to 
Macedonia. As normalization of relations is by definition a two-way street, the constructive ambiguity of 
Chapter 35 allows the Commission greater flexibility in its assessment of normalization, and prevents 
Kosovo from taking Serbia hostage in its EU-accession process. This in turn secures the credibility of the 
European perspective, and limits the chances of backsliding in Serbia. For Serbia, the EU’s recently 
invented policy of constructive ambiguity is nothing short of a godsend.  
 A comparison of the way in which the European Union has dealt with bilateral disputes and 
good neighborly relations in its framing of conditionality vis-à-vis Serbia and Macedonia reveals that 
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Serbia is benefitting from its late entrance in the accession procedure. The EU never set a hard 
conditionality for Macedonia to solve its name dispute with Greece prior to any stage of the process; 
however, the practical implication of the Greek vetoes is that Macedonia can only move forward and 
regain its European perspective once it has found a solution to the name dispute, or finds an alternative 
way to convince Greece to stop blocking its EU accession process. With regard to Serbia, the European 
Union has set in place a delicate framework that prevents one country from exercising too much 
influence over the EU accession process of another. The ambiguity of what entails normalization 
furthermore allows the EU — for now — to avoid tough questions over national boundaries; questions 
which could potentially severely impact the European perspectives of both Serbia and Kosovo. It is 
apparent that the Greco-Macedonian dispute, and the disastrous effects it has had on Macedonia’s 
European outlook, have formed an important lesson for the EU, and the current application thereof can 
be clearly witnessed in the EU’s common position on Chapter 35, which is intentionally left ambiguous 
and is characterized by soft wording (‘showing commitment,’ ‘acting in good faith,’ and the necessity to 
‘continue to make progress’): 
The EU encourages Serbia to continue showing commitment to deliver results and 
progress in the completion of the implementation work as well to work towards further 
progress in normalization […] In view of the present state of Serbia's preparations, the 
EU notes that, on the understanding that Serbia, while acting in good faith, has to 
continue to make progress in the implementation work and make further progress in 
the normalization process, Serbia can be considered to be sufficiently prepared at this 
stage for negotiations on this Chapter. (EU Common Position on Chapter 35) 
The concluding requirement sums up the EU’s soft conditionality concerning normalization: 
Serbia remains committed to the EU-facilitated Dialogue, engages in reaching further 
agreements in new subjects/areas, furthering the normalization in good faith, with a 
view gradually leading to the comprehensive normalization of relations between Serbia 
and Kosovo, in line with the negotiating framework. (ibid.) 
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 With its recent compromising stance, the European Union aided Serbia in gaining accession 
momentum, which has in turn led to a decrease in the domestic adoption costs of EU-reforms for the 
Serbian government. Even though the current SNS-dominated government of Aleksandar Vucic has been 
widely accused of using authoritarian practices — including a crackdown on the media and a systematic 
campaign to have political opponents of his regime arrested — in order to consolidate power (Bieber 
2015, Stavljnanin 2016, Dawson 2014, Ejdus 2014), the government’s popularity is to a large extent 
determined by Vucic’ public persona of being pro-European and reform-minded (Ejdus 2014). The ruling 
Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) will enter the forthcoming early elections hailing its reform record. 
Encouraging quotations from recent progress reports will surely feature prominently in the campaign, 
and recent polling indicates that Serbian citizens largely equate the governing of SNS with the 
acceleration of the EU accession process (FaktorPlus, 2016). If the European Union had insisted on 
imposing tough political conditionality on Serbia with regards to its relations with Kosovo, it is fair to 
assume that Vucic would have had much more trouble to sustain Serbia’s accession momentum.  
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CONCLUDING REMARKS: OFFERING A NEW PERSPECTIVE 
This thesis has demonstrated that the current divergence in the EU accession paths of Macedonia and 
Serbia stems from inconsistent application of political conditionality, the relatively weak political 
position of the European Commission vis-à-vis the Council of the European Union, and a general 
politicization of European enlargement, which have cumulatively benefitted Serbia, and have held back 
Macedonia’s progress in the accession procedure since 2009. These developments have resulted in a 
‘lopsided’ EU accession-queue, in which the original frontrunner is now considered the region’s greatest 
backslider, and in which Serbia has managed to outlive its ‘pariah’ past (De Launey, 2014). Furthermore, 
this thesis points out the importance for acceding states to sustain momentum throughout the 
procedure. External political intervention in that process is not necessarily harmful. The interplay 
between domestic policy preferences and a credible European perspective is mutually tied. In an ideal 
‘harmonious’ construction — a strong European perspective linked with favorable domestic policy 
preferences — we can expect an acceding state to quickly gain and sustain momentum. The opposite is 
however also true; in a ‘draconian’ construction — limited European perspective matched with 
unfavorable domestic policy preferences — momentum is nearly impossible to attain, even when 
introduced artificially. The case of Macedonia shows furthermore that the limitation of the European 
perspective directly affects domestic policy preferences, which in turn further limits the European 
perspective. The case of Serbia inversely reveals that bolstering the European perspective allows for 
domestic policy preferences to become more in line with the demands of the EU, which in turn further 
opens up the European perspective. 
 The cyclical logic described above spells doom for Macedonia’s European future, and opens the 
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door for Serbia’s accession to the EU by 2020. Macedonia’s loss of a positive recommendation — 
substituted by a conditional recommendation — will not have any significant impact on Macedonia’s EU-
accession bid. Credibility of the EU hit an all-time low in Macedonia in 2016, and the refugee crisis has 
further increased the level of frustration. The linkage of the conditional recommendation with credible 
parliamentary elections in 201611 is likely to cause a major uproar this summer, as the likelihood of 
those elections leading to the fall is VMRO-DPMNE is negligible. In fact, the European Union has 
embarked on a perilous path by linking Macedonia’s European fate with the early parliamentary 
elections, as the elections will likely reinforce VMRO-DPMNE’s grip on the country. Although efforts 
aimed at pushing fair conduct of elections deserve praise, the current political polarization in the 
country has reached a level in which the opposition cannot be expected to accept the outcome of the 
elections, even if OSCE/ODIHR positively assesses the elections’ credibility. Because of the zero-sum 
attitude of both camps, and the complete lack of political accountability, the elections are likely to cause 
a revolt by non-political means. Linked with the economic deprivation, fragile interethnic relations, and 
with the clashes in Kumanovo as an eerie foreshadower, the current EU-strategy has the potential to 
lead to renewed outbreak of conflict in Macedonia. Conflict in Macedonia is likely to impact the 
normalization process between Kosovo and Serbia, and pose a great threat to stability in the Western 
Balkans in general. This worrisome trajectory has to be avoided at all cost. 
 In order to get Macedonia back on the European track, it is imperative that the European Union 
adopt a similar strategy as it has adopted with regard to Serbia, focusing on a strong European 
perspective, and intense diplomatic lobbying to gain momentum. The winner of the early elections — 
conducted fairly — should receive the full support of the European Union. The European Commission 
                                                          
11 The Przhino Agreement initially foresaw elections taking place on 24 April, but the European Union and the 
United States have forced Macedonia to postpone the election date due to the limited progress made to ensure 
the credibility of the upcoming elections. It is foreseeable that the elections — at the time of writing scheduled for 
10 June — will be postponed again if no significant progress has been made by that date. 
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needs to issue an immediate recommendation to start accession negotiations, which has to be followed 
up by intense intergovernmental pressure on the Greek government to assure that it will agree with a 
constructively ambiguous proposal to settle the name dispute at a later stage, under auspices of the 
European Union (or a concert of EU member states) instead of the United Nations. These efforts should 
also be directed at NATO in order to secure the long overdue invitation to join the organization. 
Simultaneously, the EU should install an EU mediator — preferably the High Representative for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy — tasked with finding a solution to the name dispute, thereby taking charge 
of the bilateral dispute in a similar fashion as it has done with the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue. Following 
the opening of accession negotiations, the European Commission will have to open Chapters 23 and 24, 
along with the chapters in which the acquis-alignment has already been satisfactorily established, and 
close some of these chapters early on in the process for reforms to gain momentum. Additionally, a 
separate Chapter 35 — opened first and closed last — will have to hold Macedonia accountable for 
showing good faith in normalizing relations with Greece, and include a commitment to abstain from acts 
that could possibly damage good neighborly relations. This has been a recipe for success for Serbia, and 
there is no reason to expect it would not work for Macedonia.  
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